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THE PROPOSED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR MISSOURI
-PARTIES AND PLEADINGS
HARRY W. HENRY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

For nearly a century Missouri courts have been functioning under a
code of civil procedure which was originally adapted from the Field Code
in New York.' Missouri, like many other states, took advantage of the
wave of procedural reform which the Field Commission had inspired and
in it found the strength to break away from the procedural rules of the
common law. The code at once proved itself and greatly facilitated civil
procedure in our courts. But Missouri, unlike New York and many of the
other code states, failed to amend and modernize her procedure to keep
pace with the times.2 Our code, except for a few changes, has largely remained as passed in 1849.
The recent adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
wide discussion evoked by their formulation have set men's minds once
again to the problem of procedural improvement. Missouri, following the
example of several other states, is reexamining her present system of procedure, with the view of revising it and bringing it up to date. At the
sixtieth session of the General Assembly of Missouri a resolution was passed
requesting the supreme court to make its recommendations to the next ses*Attorney, San Francisco, Cal. A.B., 1938, Washington University; LL.B.,
1941, Harvard. Member, Missouri and California Bar.
1. Mo. Laws 1848-49, pp. 73-109.
2. E.g., Missouri still retains the strict code provisions as to joinder of
parties. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 852-854. New York, on the other hand, adopted
in 1921 a provision permitting free joinder of parties patterned after the English
rule. N. Y. C. P. A. § 209. See note 46, infra.
(1)
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sion of the legislature "for a revised code and rules of civil procedure."
Accordingly, the supreme court appointed a committee of fifty-three lawyers
to investigate the desirability of changing the existing procedure and to
make their recommendation to the court.
Not long after the committee had set to work, it became apparent that
opinion both in the committee and the state at large was divided on the
question of the preferable method of attack. One group felt that the present
code was good enough, and all that was needed was some modernizing
amendments. The other favored the adoption of a wholly new code to be
patterned after the Federal Rules. In view of this split the committee decided to work out two separate programs. After laboring for over a year
the committee finally made its report to the supreme court on December 10,
1940, in the form of two legislative proposals. 4 The first consisted of a few
specific amendments to be made to the present code. The second was a
complete draft of a general code, entitled, A Proposed Code of Civil Procedure for thre State of Missouri. The supreme court reported this progress
to the Sixty-First General Assembly and without indicating its own conclusions, requested the legislature to renew its invitation, extending to the
following session the time when the court should make its recommendations
and giving to the bar of the state opportunity to study, understand, criticize
and support the work undertaken and accomplished.
The legislature renewed the invitation as requested and ordered copies
of the two plans printed for statewide distribution. The supreme court has
appointed a new committee, entitled the Special Committee on Suggestions
for Revision of the Civil Code, and the question is now before the bar of
the state for discussion.
It is the opinion of the writer that the supreme court should urge the
legislature to adopt the Advisory Committee's "Proposed Code" (known as
3. House Joint and Concurrent Resolution No. 23 (1939). Prior to the
introduction of this resolution an attempt had been made to secure the passage of
an enabling act that would have empowered the supreme court to regulate procedure
by rules of court (House Bill 386). The bill would have given the Missouri court
substantially the same powers that Congress conferred on the United States Supreme
Court Compare U. S. C., tit. 28, §§ 723 (b), (c). Regrettably the legislature
failed to pass it. This action is entirely out of line with the recent trend. See
Miller, Notabilza of American Civil Procedure,1887-1937 (1937) 50 HARv. L. REV.
1017, 1063, where he states that the trend towards regulation by rules of court is
"so impressive as to rank it first of the procedural events of that period."
4. See letter of transmittal, Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Civil
Procedure.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss1/7
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Plan II) for he feels that the improvement of our procedure can be more surely achieved through the adoption of a wholly new code than by an attempt to
patch up an old one. This Proposed Code has been largely adapted from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact a great many sections have
been taken bodily from the rules and incorporated verbatim. In some of
the sections only minor and formal changes were necessary to compose differences incident to the two jurisdictions; for example, the Missouri "sheriff"
was substituted for the federal "marshall" in a section on service of summons.5 Several sections have been added which deal with special features of
Missouri procedure and are, of course, not to be found in the Rules. Thus
the Proposed Code is somewhat longer and more detailed than the Rules,
but considerably shorter, more compact, and more competently drafted than
our present code. Although at times the Proposed Code has departed considerably from the Federal Rules, it does represent a fair duplication of the
latter and embodies most of the great procedural gains which they achieved.
As already indicated, we shall be primarily concerned with the provisions of the Proposed Code which cover parties and pleadings. However,
before turning to these, it is well to consider the first article of the new code
which is entitled, General Provisions.
GENERAL PROVISIONS

The Proposed Code makes the usual provision for the one form of
action6 and for its application to all civil proceedings whether cognizable as
cases at law or in equity.7 This principle of the singleness of the form of the
action and of the fusion of law and equity is found in the Federal Rules8
and in the existing Missouri code. 9 Further comment about a provision so
common to all modern codes would not be necessary here, if it were not
for the omission from the Proposed Code of a section equivalent to Federal
Rule 38.20 The reason for this will become apparent in a moment.
In Missouri we have not yet achieved the complete union of law and
Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 5, § 4.
6. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 1, § 3.
7. Id. at Art. 1, § 1.
8. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 1 and 2.
9. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 847.
10. Federal Rule 38(b) provides that any party may demand a trial by
jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by making a written demand therefor
not later than ten days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue,
and 38(d), that the failure of the party to make a timely demand constitutes a
waiver by him of trial by jury.
5.
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equity which the adoption of the Field Code was intended to secure, nor
have we been alone in this experience." Our courts have acknowledged
that distinctions of form have been abolished but hold that substantive
distinctions still persist, 12 in spite of the statute. 3 Where the pleadings set
forth facts raising legal issues the action is one at law, but if the pleadings
present issues of equitable cognizance the action is one in equity. 4 This
tendency of the courts to preserve the substantive distinctions has been
largely due to the influence of two factors: (1) the theory of the pleadings
doctrine, and (2) the right of jury trial in common law causes.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Missouri courts, probably because of the predilection for the old forms, adhered closely to the
strict view that the party must recover on the theory of his pleading, or
fail.' 5 If the proof at the trial did not sustain the theory on which recovery
was sought, the party was not at liberty to amend even though the pleadings contained the essential allegations upon which another and consistent
theory could be established. The effect of such a rule was to preserve in
spirit the rigidity inherent in the multiplicity of the forms of action, the
very thing the code was designed to get away from. At common law one
selected his writ; under the code he chose his theory. In either case the
pleader elected his remedy at his peril. In 1910, Missouri turned toward
the more liberal view which permits the party to recover under any theory
which may be fairly founded upon the cause of action stated.'6 There has
been some vacillation by the Missouri courts from one view to the other
17 Nevertheless,
since then, and hence it is doubtful what the exact rule is.
11.

E.g., Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512 (1917). "In New

York, the birth state of the Code, there seems to be actually less fusion today than

there was seventy-five years ago." Clark, Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25
CoL. L. REv. 1, 2.
1Z. Sandwich Mfg. Co. v. Bogie, Adm., 317 Mo. 972, 982, 298 S.W. 56 (1927).
13. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 847. Clark points out that the corresponding
provision in the original New York Field Code was intended by its makers to
abolish not only the forms but the "inherent" distinctions between actions at law
and in equity. Clark, op. cit. p. 3.
14. Ebbs v. Neff, 325 Mo. 1182, 1191, 30 S.W. (2d) 616 (1930).
15. See, Albertsworth, The Theory of the Pleadings in Code States (1922)
10 CAL. L. Rm. 202, 209, and review of cases cited; Whittier, The Theory of a
Pleading (1908) 8 CoL- L. REv. 522, 532; James, Trial by Jury and the New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1022, 1026-28.

16. See discussion of F. L. Kuhlman, Theory of a Pleading Under the Mis-

souri Code (1937) 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 251.
17. The Missouri law on this matter is in a state of flux. The more recent

appellate decisions follow the liberal view, e.g., Vaughn v. Missouri Power & Light
Co., 89 S. W. (2d) 699 (Mo. App. 1935), while some of the older supreme court
decisions have applied the stricter view, e.g., Sandwich Mfg. Co. v. Bogie, supra.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss1/7
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the tendency is in the right direction. The more liberal view certainly must
prevail and with it we may expect a union of law and equity which is more
real and complete.
The other factor impeding the unification of law and equity is the
right to trial by jury of issues of fact in actions at law. Inasmuch as our
constitution contains the usual provision that the "right to jury trial shall
remain inviolate, '" i s courts have felt compelled at all times during the proceedings to distinguish between legal and equitable issues with regard to
the necessity of preserving a party's right to such trial.1 9 Former Dean Clark
of Yale20 and others21 have argued that the courts under the codes have
felt an unnecessary compulsion in this respect. They maintain that the
jury question should not have been permitted to influence the pleading stage
of the proceedings. Their argument is based on the fact that the pleadings
under the codes were intended to serve only the function of informing the
court and other parties of the facts upon which the petitioning party based
his right of recovery. They were not intended "to serve as sign posts to
indicate the kind of trial desired." 2 When the pleadings are closed and the
issues defined there is then ample time in which to determine what the
form of the trial shall be. Indeed, under a unified system of law and equity
such as was contemplated by the codes, one should not have referred to
issues as being "legal" or "equitable." They contend rather that it would
have been more proper had the issues raised by the pleadings been simply
denominated as "jury" or "court? issues.
However, the codes as they were drawn did not present a clean break
with the old common law system. Much of the old was reflected in the procedural devices of the new. It is too much to have expected court and counsel
to have ceased thinking in terms of legal as distinguished from equitable
issues over night. The pleadings were bound to have reflected the same
tendency. So long as the distinction had to be ultimately drawn for trial
purposes, it was only natural for counsel to have used the pleadings to exploit his claim for a jury trial or for an equitable proceeding as the case
18. Mo. CoNsT. art. II, § 28.
19. Ebbe v. Neff, supra.
20. Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, (1925) 25 CoL. L. REV. 1; Clark
and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedre--Il, Pleadings and Parties (1935) 44
YALE L. J. 1291; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 44-67.
21. Pike and Fisher, Pleadings and Jury Rigrts in thte New Federal Procedure
(1940) 88 U. PA. L. REV. 645.
22. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 65.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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might be. Nevertheless, Clark has pictured a desirable goal and one which
we hope ultimately to attain. Consequently, any device which will lead us
in this direction by removing obstructions to the unification of law and
equity should be earnestly considered.
The most obvious would be that of curtailing trial by jury. In England, by act of Parliament, the scope of jury trial has been confined to certain kinds of action.23 In Missouri such a course it not open unless we are
ready to amend our constitution. This is neither suggested nor contemplated. The niost effective device yet evolved for effectuating a more limited
use of the jury and yet which preserves the constitutional right is that of
requiring a party to make a timely demand or be deemed to have waived
his rights. This scheme is being used successfully in Federal Rules;24 some
states have gone farther and require the party to pay a special jury fee .2
It has been found that the number of jury trials tend to decrease considerably,26 and hence the problem of distinguishing between legal and equitable

issues ceases to be of such significance.27 Only in the cases where a jury trial
is claimed need the court ever bother about the presence of jury issues at
all. And even in these cases the jury question need not affect the pleadingstage to any extent. This is true, because generally the demand for jury
trial will come near the close of pleading and after issues have been defined. 28
Consequently the pleading-stage is frequently over before the problem really
presents itself. Thus the effect of the troublesome jury question can be re-

23. 23 & 24, Geo. V, c. 36, § 6 (1933).
24. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 38.
25. E.g., Ill. Civ. Pract. Act 1933, § 64 (1); CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. (Deering,
1937) § 631(5); MIcH. COMP. LAws (1929) § 14273.

26. Connecticut adopted this method with its code in 1880. For present
provision see CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5624. The result has been more jury
waived cases. CLARK, CODE PLEADINGS (1928) 68. On page 54 he makes an interesting comparison between the number of jury-tried cases in Connecticut in
1927 with the number in New York which has the affirmative waiver provisions
found in most of the Field Codes, including our own. (Compare N. Y. C. P. A.
§ 426 with Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1101. See also the discussion in Pike and
Fisher, op. cit. 88 U. PA. L. REv. 645, 646-49.
27. In Connecticut out of all cases examined over a certain period, only
about 7% had juries. Most of these were negligence and tort actions. Thus only
about 1.6% of all the cases filed ever present a sharp jury-trial problem. Pike and
Fisher, op. cit. p. 648. That the necessity of demand for jury and jury fee has
reduced the incidence of jury trials, see Miller, The Old Regime and the New in
Civil Procedure (1936) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 1, 20.
28. As to the best time for requiring a demand for jury trial, see James,
Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1022,
1048.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss1/7
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duced to a minimum, thereby removing one, stumbling-block in the way
of complete union of law and equity.
The preliminary draft of the Proposed Code incorporated Federal Rule
38 verbatim. However, the committee, at the November, 1940, meeting,
emasculated all of the provision with the exception of the section guaranteeing the right to trial by jury.29 A chance to improv~e our procedure generally
and to reduce the cost of rendering justice by cutting down the use of jury
trials has been lost. The possibilities of a complete fusion of law and equity
in Missouri is as remote as ever. The action of the committee is indeed
regrettable.
In regard to service and filing of pleadings and other papers, the Pro'posed Code30 as drawn conformed exactly to Federal Rule 5. The only substantial change this provision would have made in the existing practise
would have been the sanctioning of service of pleadings, etc., by mail. The
full committee rejected the prospective change, although service by mail
seems to be working well enough in the federal courts, and is certainly an
added convenience. Instead, on this detail they decided to retain existing
practice and inserted, by way of amendment to section 5, the present statutory provision 3 ' on service of papers.
Time provisions of the Federal Rules are embodied intact in the
Proposed Code.3 2 The computation of time and the time of hearing of
33
motions does not involve a substantial change over the existing procedure.
The present free discretion of Missouri courts to enlarge time to file pleadings and motions34 is extended to matters generally but would, of course,
be limited in two respects as in the case of federal practice 35 where the court
is not permitted to enlarge the period for making a motion for new trial,
or the period for taking an appeal as provided by law. The procedural technicalities which have grown up around the outmoded institution of terms of
court will be largely eliminated, for the period of time provided for the
9, § 8.
1, §§ 4-8.
§ 910.
31.
32. Id. at Art. 1, §§ 9-12. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 6.
33. Compare Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 907 and 912; § 912 (adopted in
1848) provided for service of notice five days prior to hearing. The Proposed Code
will narrow the time to two days, art. 1, § 12. The Federal Rules provide for five
days, Rule 6(d); otherwise the Proposed Code and Federal Rules are identical as
to time provisions.
34. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 942.
35. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 6(b).
PROP. CODE, Art
PROP. CODE, Art
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939)

29. Mo.
30. Mo.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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doing of an act is not to be affected by the expiration of a term of court.80
Terms of court could not be abolished directly for the Missouri Constitution
requires the circuit court to hold at least two terms annually in each county.8 '
This constitutional hurdle, however, is neatly circumvented by providing

that every term shall continue until the opening of the next term." This
improvement is an important one and should be welcomed by the bar
generally.
PARTIES

The article on parties substantially covers the same material as Federal Rules 17 to 25." A few minor changes and'some additions have been
made. It will be of interest, therefore, to note what salutary effects if any
these provisions may have.
The real party in interest provision found in the Federal Rules and the
Proposed Code has the same content as sections 698 and 699 of the existing
procedure4 0 These sections have been interpreted rather narrowly in Missouri,4 1 and it was hoped that some change could have been made. Unfortunately, the literal adoption of the Federal Rules in this situation may
only preserve the existing law, for our courts will very likely continue to
interpret this provision in line with the cases which have construed sections
698 and 699. Here it would have seemed desirable for the committee to
have departed from the Federal Rules, or at least to have included a supplementary section, which would have required our courts to reach an interpretation consonant with that obtaining under the Federal Rules, and in
the more liberal states.
Next we come to joinder of parties. So far as compulsory joinder is
concerned, the same results will obtain under the Proposed Code as in the

36. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 1, § 11.
37. Mo. CONsT. art. 6, § 22.
38. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 1, § 16.
39. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art 2, §§ 1-25. Federal Rule 18 on Joinder of Claims,
however, has been included in art. 6 which deals with Pleadings and Motions. As
to Third Party Impleader, see note 65, infra.

40. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 17(a); Mo. PROP.
(1939) §§ 849, 850.
41.

CODE,

Art. 2, § 1; Mo.

REV. STAT.

Wheaton, Missouri Practiceand the Federal Rules: A Comparative Study

(1940) 25 WAsH. U. L. Q 505, 516. That the Missouri courts take a "narrow and
technical view" as to the right of an equitable owner to sue in ejectment, see CLARK,

CODE PLEADING (1928) 114. See also Clark, The Real Party in Interest Statute in
Missouri (1914) 4 U. oF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 3.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss1/7
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existing practice, namely that persons having joint interests must be made
parties.4 2 Permissive joinder, however, presents far more difficulty.
The Field Code made a more liberal provision for permissive joinder
of parties plaintiff over that of the common law. 43 It was visualized that all
persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the
relief demanded might join as plaintiffs." The courts went to work on
this provision and in some of the states constricted the expected possibilities
of joinder greatly. Narrow definitions were assigned to the phrase "subject
of the action" and a requirement that the plaintiffs each have an interest
in all the relief demanded was exacted. If a plaintiff had an interest in the
judgment less than the entire amount demanded there was declared a misjoinder. 45 Missouri has joined with the minority in following this illiberal
view.4" Under the Proposed Code persons claiming a right to relief jointly,
severally, or in the alternative may join in one action if such right arises
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if a question of law or fact common to all will be raised in the
action.47 This would eliminate all the technicalities which have grown up
about "the subject of the action." Alternative joinder, a device which may
be very useful at times, would be new for it was neither permitted at common law nor under the Field Code. The Proposed Code would specifically
abolish the requirement that a person be interested in all the relief demanded, by allowing a plaintiff to recover judgment according to his respective interest in the relief demanded.48
Missouri also stands in the illiberal column so far as joinder of defendants is concerned, although there has been a tendency to relax this position

42. Compare: Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 2, §§ 6 and 7 with Federal Rule 19,
and Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 853 and 972. The Proposed Code has been amended
to omit Federal Rule 19(b) and (c), and Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 972 has been
substituted. Both provide that whenever a complete determination of a controversy cannot be had without the presence of other persons, they may be ordered
to appear in the action.
43. Generally joinder was permitted only where persons had joint interests.
CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 244.
44. See Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 851, 852 and 854.
45. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) n. 62, p. 253.
46. For a good discussion of the rule in Missouri and review of the cases, see
POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) 193. He states that Missouri courts have
in effect been willing to apply § 851 only to equitable and not legal actions.
47. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 2, § 9; also Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 20(a).
48. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 2, § 9.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1942], Art. 7
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

somewhat. 49 Joinder of defendants would also be completely liberalized by
the Proposed Code, for the same test of joinder is applied as in the case of
plaintiffs.
It is evident that the test of "a common question of law and fact" was
originally taken from equity where a practice of much freer joinder prevailed. It was first adapted by the English nearly a half century ago.10
Since then several American jurisdictions have incorporated the English
Rule into their codes."' Fears that joinder will run unbridled are not well
founded, since the court has the discretion to order separate trials whenever
joinder would result in delay or prejudice, or unduly embarrass one of the
parties. 52 Such a rule naturally tends to reduce litigation for all parties involved in a dispute may be joined and the controversy settled in one action.
Whether the Proposed Code is accepted or not, the Missouri legislature
should follow the lead of the more liberal states and make free joinder of
parties a part of our procedure.
Missouri has no general interpleader statute such as that found in the
New York Code as amended in 1851.13 What provisions we do have are
scattered through our code conferring upon the party a right to interplead
in certain specified situations. The two oldest sections make interpleader
possible where property or money has been subjected to an attachment 4
or garnishment. 55 In 1911, as a part of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act, a warehouseman was given the privilege to interplead rival claimants to
the good which he held either by way of original or defensive interpleader. °
With the passage of the Uniform Bill of Lading Act in 1917 the same was
accorded to carriers. 57 The Proposed Code would make original interpleader
49. E.g., certain early cases held that inasmuch as a guarantor's undertaking
is a separate and independent contract, and not a joint engagement with the principal, a joint action against both principal and guarantor cannot be maintained,
Graham v. Ringo, 67 Mo. 324 (1878). But, Write Away Pen Co. v. Buckner, 188
Mo. App. 259, 175 S. W. 81 (1915) allowed joinder. McConnon & Co. v. Kennon,
281 S. W. 450, 451 (Mo. 1926), semble.
50. As to the English practice, see Miller, Notabilia of American Civil
Procedure, 1887-1937 (1937) 50 HARV. L. REV. 1017, 1022.
51. CAL. CODE CIVIL PRoc. (Deering, 1937) §§ 378, 379a; N. J. CoMP. STAT.
(2 Cum. Supp., 1911-1924) tit. 163, §§ 280, 282; N. Y. C. P. A. §§ 209, 211;
ILL. REV. STAT. (1937) c. 110, §§ 147-148.
52. Mo. PRoP. CODE, Art. 2, § 10; also Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 20(b).
53. New York Laws, CODE OF PROCEDURE, § 122.
54. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1489.
55. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1568.
56. Mo. Laws 1911, p. 431; Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 15515.
57. Mo. Laws 1917, p. 564; Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 15575.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss1/7

10

Henry: Henry: Proposed Code of Civil Procedure
PROPOSED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

1942]

available to any person who might be exposed to double or multiple liability,
and defensive interpleader- would be obtainable by cross-claim, or counterclaim.' s The provision would eliminate the old requirements of privity and
identity of claims, and permit the stakeholder to have an interest in the
fund. Such an interpleader provision might not be necessary in view of the
free joinder of parties permitted by Art. 2, § 9, because as has been suggested,
the joinder provision of itself could probably take care of all situations
calling for interpleader. 0 But the provision should obviously be retained
for it serves to make the code more elastic, and abolishes some old distinctions which might arise to cause further harassment.
As in the case of interpleader, Missouri has no general statute 0 covering
intervention, but there are several sections in the code 61 giving a third person the right to intervene in certain types of proceedings where he claims
an interest in property subject to litigation.62 Under the contemplated intervention provision of the Proposed Code, these statutes would be unaffected, for such rights as are conferred by statute are preserved. 63 Otherwise, the Proposed Code would greatly broaden the possibilities of intervention in Missouri both as to intervention by right and permissive intervention. An applicant would be able to intervene as of right wherever his interests are inadequately represented by existing parties, and he might be
bound by a judgment. Also, an applicant may intervene where he may be
adversely affected by distribution of property in the custody of the court.
Permissive intervention is extended along the line of permissive joinder of
58. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 2, § 12; Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 22.
59. CLARK, PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE, CLEVELAND (1938) p. 263.

60. The closest approach to a general statute is Mo. REV. STAT. (1939)
§ 852 which provides that, "any person may be a defendant who has or claims an
interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff.

. .

."

This provision has

been so narrowly construed as to exclude much chance of intervention. Where a
30 year adverse possessor sued the holder of the paper title to quiet title, and a
third party who claimed part of the land also by adverse possession tried to intervene, held: not entitled to intervene, since he had no "interest in the controversy." Miller v. Boulware, 267 Mo. 487, 492, 184 S. W. 1148 (1916).
61. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 343 (any person claiming title to land
against which dower is asserted may be made defendant); § 1489 (the same as
to property or money subjected to attachment); § 1533 (person from whom defendant in ejectment derives title); there are several others.
62. The early codes provided generally that in an action for recovery of
real or personal property, a person not a party may intervene if he has an interest
in the subject matter. New York Laws, CODE OF PROCEDURE, § 122. This was

widely adopted. For list of states, see POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed., 1929)
462. Since the Missouri Code was adopted in 1849, such provision does not appear.
63.

Mo.

PROP.- CODE,

Art. 2, §§ 18, 19. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 24(a), (b).
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parties by making the test of a common question of law or fact the determining factor. Again, as in case of joinder the court has the discretion to
deny the applicant's motion if it would delay or prejudice the original parties
to the action. The state or any subdivision thereof is given right to intervene wherever the validity of a statute or regulation involving public interest is being contested.64
Third party impleader, as set forth in the Federal Rules, is provided
for in the Proposed Code, giving the defendant the privilege of bringing in
any person not a party to the action, who may be liable to him on the plaintiff's claim, or directly liable to the plaintiff."5 It is a procedural device
relatively new in the American scene having been tried for the first time in
the United States by Wisconsin in 1915.66 Traditionally, under the codes a
defendant could not bring in third persons unless the strict grounds of
joinder were met; indeed, a defendant's *right to cross-claim against a person
already a party was confined to only those claims which could be interposed
in defense of plaintiff's cause of action. This is the existing practice in
Missouri. 67 Third party impleader should be made a part of our procedure
for it tends to reduce litigation and costs by enabling a settlement to be
made in one proceeding of what would normally require several distinct
proceedings.
In Missouri, representative suits or class actions are proper only in
cases of equitable cognizance.6 8 Most of the code states, following the example set by New York in 1849, have passed statutes making representative
suits equally available in legal causes.' Federal Rule 23, which the Proposed Code has followed, 7 0 exhibits an attempt simply to codify the ancient
equity practice.71 The test is laid down that where persons constituting a
class are very numerous and there is a common question of law or fact
affecting the rights of each, and common relief is sought, they may all be

64. Compare: Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 2, § 20 and Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 24(e).
65. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 2, § 16; Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 14. Note that third
party impleader has been classified as a section on parties, whereas, in the Federal
Rules it is dealt with under "Pleadings and Motions."
66. Wis. Laws 1915, c. 219, § 6; Wis. STAT. (1935) § 260.19. See also, New
York Laws 1922, c. 624; N. Y. C. P. A. § 193.
67. Campbell v. Spotts, 331 Mo. 974, 55 S. W. (2d) 986 (1932).
68. Discussed in Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477 at 488, 15 S. W. 618 at 620
(1890).
69. New York Laws 1849, c. 438, § 119; N. Y. C. P. A. § 195. For list of
states see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 277.
70. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 2, §§ 13-15.
71. See old Federal Equity Rule 38.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss1/7
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represented in a suit by some member of the class. Such a rule would not
only make possible class actions in legal causes, but would also perform the
added service of clarifying our existing equity rule, the limits of which
have been difficult to define. Interesting to note also is that Proposed Code
specifically exempts labor unions from the operation of this section so far
as their rights to sue or be sued are concerned.
Substitution of parties need not detain us, for the Proposed Code would
cause no substantial change."2 However, the provision for substitution,
modeled after Federal Rule 25, would greatly simplify our existing statute
law which covers approximately twenty sections. 73 Substitution of parties,
under the Federal Rule, in case of death, incompetency or transfer of interest may be made at any time within two years after the death of such
party. The time for making the motion under the existing practice is made
to depend upon terms of court. The Proposed Code has set the period at
one year.
PLEADINGS

The Article on Pleadings and Motions in the larger part conforms to
Federal Rules 7 to 16. The Proposed Code, however, makes one important
departure and that is in the manner in which objections are taken to pleadings. It will be seen that the procedural machinery for handling objections
as developed by the Proposed Code manifests a wholly different pleading
concept from that of the Federal Rules.7 4 Joinder of claims as noted above
is included under this heading" although in the Federal Rules it appears
under "Parties." These are the principle distinctions; others will be noted
in the discussion which follows.
The Proposed Code visualizes the adoption of federal pleadings to state
practice."" We would have a petition and an answer; reply would be made
only if the answer contained a counterclaim denominated as such, or if the
court ordered a reply to be made. Further pleading would be permitted
only in case there was a cross-claim or third party petition. Objections and
certain defenses would be taken by motion. In the present state practice we
have a petition and an answer or demurrer or both; plaintiff may reply or

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 2, § 21-25.

Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §H 1042-1056 and 1220-1224.
Compare: Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12, and Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 6, H6 30-41.
Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 6, H6 6 and 7.
Compare: Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 7, and Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 1, § 1.
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demur to new matter set up in the answer. Outside of demurrer to the reply
and the regular code motions, further pleading is not permitted."7 It is
evident that the proposed procedure would cut the pleadings under the
existing practice at least one step shorter and in some cases two. Professor
Carl Wheaton in canvassing the possibilities of adapting the Federal Rules to
Missouri practice voiced objection to the reduced number of pleadings and
to their rather sketchy content.7 He suggested that in a state version of
the Federal Rules, pleadings should be made flexible by permitting courts
to allow pleadings beyond the reply. If only a minimum of pleadings are
permitted, parties may go to trial uncertain of the issues. That fuller and
more detailed pleadings are wanted, should be indicated by expanding the
federal forms which accompany the Rules.
With this position I cannot agree. Since we are contemplating a complete revision of our practice, so as to draw it into line with the Federal
Rules, it would seem desirable to adhere to the procedural principles of that
system as closely as possible. These Rules exhibit a new pleading concept
which is somewhat different from that of fact pleading upon which our
present practice is based. Fact pleading was introduced by the code-makers
in the middle of the last century to avoid the artificiality and complexity
of common law pleading.70 Pleadings were not to go on mechanically till a
single issue was reached. Rather it was expected that by confining the
pleadings to the ultimate facts that the issues would be as clearly raised and
that the pleadings could be cut short at the reply. Thus, in the terms of
the codes, the pleader was required to set forth the "substantive facts"
constituting his "cause of action."'8o Evidence or legal conclusions could not
be plead. The courts found it necessary to draw fine distinctions between
facts, law, and evidence, whenever the sufficiency of a pleading was questioned by a demurrer.8' The term "cause of action" has also given the courts
a great deal of trouble so that it is now very difficult to define or' employ
the term.8 2 As a result of this body of judicial opinion, pleadings under the
77. See Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) §§ 916, 920, 922, 924, 928, 931.
78. Wheaton, Missouri Practiceand the Federal Rules: A Comparative Study
(1940) 25 WAsH. U. L. Q. 505, 509, 511.
79. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 30, 150.
80. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 916.
81. Simpson, A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem (1939) 53 HARV.
L. REv. 169, 183-184; Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-Il,
Pleadings and Parties (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1291, 1303.
82. Miller, Notabiia of American Civil Procedure, 1887-1937 (1937) 50 HARV.
L. REV. 1017, 1040; Simpson, op. cit. (1939) 53 HARv. L. REv. 169, 184. See list
of cases in POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (1929) §§ 411, 412, 413.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss1/7
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codes have emerged as rather detailed and complicated affairs, the very
thing the code-makers wanted to get away from.
The Federal Rules have approached the pleading question from a
somewhat different angle. The tendency is decidedly toward a more general
kind of pleading rather than the detailed and lengthier pleadings characteristic of the Codes. An examination of the forms which accompany the Rules
reveals this fact very clearly. 3 Witness how Rule 8 dealing with the content
of pleadings has been drafted. The pleader need make only "a short and
plain statement showing that he is entitled to relief." Under this rule all
the pleader is called upon to do is to appraise the other party of his claim,
so as to fairly advise him what he is being sued for. The tricky "cause of
action" has been purposely omitted from the draft. The requirement that
"substantive facts" be plead to the exclusion of evidence and legal conclusions is no longer imposed. Thus a fertile field of judicial technicality has
been swept away and with it the opportunities for delay and obstruction
which it gave.84 From the foregoing it is evident that the traditional function of pleading has been modified. The emphasis is no longer upon the
formulation of issues. Rather the office of pleading has become one of
notification. The problem of developing and formulating issues for trial has
been left to the more efficient procedural devices of discovery and pre-trial
conference. 8-'
Through the machinery of a liberal discovery a party may learn in
advance of trial upon what the opposite party is basing his claim, and how
he will seek to prove it. Opportunity for surprise is minimized by the right
of either party to examine the other or his witnesses by oral or written
interrogatories, and by the privilege of examining on showing good cause,
any document or papers which are material to the action and in possession
of the adverse party." This free examination of witnesses and parties enables
counsel to know in advance what the nature of their testimony will be and
83.

See, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 84, also Clark, The Handmaid of Justice (1938)
U. L. Q. 296, 316-18.
84. Brown, Pleading Under the Proposed Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
(1940) 14 FLA. L. J. 382, 383; Clark, Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 447, 450.
85. Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: I
(1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1179.
86. Hyde, Streamlined Procedure (1940) 8 KAN. Cirr L. REv. 205, 212;
Clark, op. cit. (1938) 23 WASH. U. L. Q 296, 318. For general discussion see,
Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under Federal Rules (1939) 15 TENN. L.
REv. 737.
23

WASH.
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in general what course the trial may be expected to take. By means of pretrial conferences,,8 issues of fact and law may be definitively drawn. Both
counsel together with the judge can in a short space of time shape the pleadings, and by compromise and stipulation agree upon the litigable issues
presented by the case. By weeding out sham and irrelevant matters in
advance, trials may be shortened, for only the real issues in dispute ever
get before the court and jury. Experience has demonstrated that quite frequently such pre-trial scrutiny of a case is conducive of compromise or settlement simply because no issue really worth a trial is shown to exist. Pretrial procedure therefore not only simplifies the case, but tends to reduce
the costs of rendering justice as well.88
The Proposed Code in adopting the general or notice pleading of the
Federal Rules has not failed to make provision for discovery or pre-trial
procedure.8 0 The existing Missouri law on discovery by deposition 0 which
is considered liberal and wholly satisfactory"1 has been retained, but has been
supplemented by the Federal Rules which deal with discovery by way of
interrogatories, production of documents, physical and mental examination
2
of persons, and of admission of facts and of genuineness of documents .
The pre-trial procedure of Federal Rule 16 has been taken over.08 One basic
87. See note 93, infra.
88. Pre-trial procedure has been found successful in Boston, Detroit and
Cleveland where it has done much to relieve congested trial calendars. Mitchell,
Some of the Problems Confronting the Advisory Committee in Recent MonthY
(1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 966, 969. There are several articles which describe the operation of pre-trial procedure and its effectiveness. See, Sunderland, The Theory and
Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure (1937) 36 MicH. L. REv. 215; Phillips, Should the
Ride of Federal Civil Procedure Be Adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida
(1940) 14 FLA. L. J. 339, 342; Moynihan, Observations on Pre-Trial Procedure
(1940) 11 Mo. BAR J. 144 (relating Judge Moynihan's personal experiences with
pre-trial work in Detroit).
89. Mo. PROP. CODE, Aft. 8, and Art. 6, § 55.
90. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) §§ 1917-1948, 1953-1970.
91. Hyde op. cit. (1940) 8 KAN. CITy L. REV. 205, 213. That the Missouri
provisions have adequately protected defendants from "fishing expeditions," see
Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New Rules (1936) 22 A. B. A. J.
787, 789.
92. Compare: Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and Mo. PROP. CODE,
Art. 8, §§ 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. There have been several minor changes made. It seems
a mistake, however, to have dropped Federal Rule 37(b) (1) making it a contempt
of court for refusing to make discovery.
93. Federal Rule 16 provides: In any action the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider
1) The simplification of the issues;
2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to pleadings;
3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which
will avoid unnecessary proof;
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss1/7
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objection to the provision as drafted is that it fails to make pre-trial
procedure compulsory. 94 In this respect the Proposed Code should not have
followed the Federal Rules.
To sum up then, we may say that there is really nothing to fear from
requiring shorter and more general pleading in Missouri courts. Ample
procedural safeguards are contemplated which will assure against surprise
and prevent uncertainty of issue at trial. Giving Missouri courts permission
to extend pleadings at will, as Professor Wheaton would have us do, would
be an open invitation to continue the existing practice of detailed code
pleading. The natural tendency of court and bar is to perpetuate the old
ways, with the result that a program for procedural improvement is very
often crippled and distorted from the start.95 We want to avoid this if we
can. The Proposed Code has therefore properly indicated that a new kind
of pleading is meant and wanted.
Federal Rule 11 requires an attorney to sign a pleading. His signature
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to the
best of his knowledge there is good ground to support it, and that it has
not been interposed for delay. "For a wilful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may
be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted." The Proposed Code,
as originally drafted, included the same provisions but the full committee
withdrew them. There seems to be no reason for such action even though
there is doubt that attorneys may be effectively policed through such a
measure. This language certainly would have done no harm, and would
4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for
findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be to the jury;
6) Such other matters as may aid in the distribution of the action.
Art. 6, § 55 of PROPOSED CODE has dropped "5" and "6," above. It seems a
mistake to cut-out "6" for it is desirable to give pre-trial judge ample discretion.
94. Mitchell, op. cit. (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 966, 970, explains that pre-trial
was not made compulsory in the Federal Rules, because the drafting committee
felt that the rule could be effective only if sympathetic cooperation of the federal
judges were secured, and that this could not be gained through compulsion. However, in England it is compulsory.
95. "The attitude taken by the courts at the outset will control the operation of practice acts long after new generations of judges have come upon the
bench with more liberal views. The original New York Code of Civil Procedure
failed of effect in many important particulars, . . . because so many of the
judges who were first called upon to administer it were determined to limit its
operation and preserve the principles and the dogmas of the older procedure
wherever possible." Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform'(1910) 4 ILL.

L. REv. 388, 390. As to the early illiberal interpretation of Missouri Code, see
Hyde, Simplification of Missouri Procedure (1939) 7 KAN. CITy L. REv. 225, 226.
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have furnished a court with a clear basis for meting out punishment to an
attorney should it ever have occasion to do so.
The provision on joinder of claims in the Proposed Code will permit
great improvement in the existing practice. 0 As our code is now constituted, seven categories of "causes of action" are set forth within any one
of which joinder is permitted." One cannot join causes in one category
with those of another. The whole scheme is rather clumsy and needlessly
complex. This standard code provision has been gradually giving way to
a more liberal type patterned after the English rule which has been followed
by several states. The tendency has been constantly towards freer joinder
and in the Federal Rules the principle' is carried to its fullest extent by permitting unlimited joinder of claims whether the parties are identical or
multiple. Thus, under Federal Rule 18, it is difficult to conceive of a claim
which could not be joined. The only limitation placed upon the right of
joinder is the power of the judge to order separate trials where it would
be unwieldy or confusing to try the joined claims at the same time.9 9 This
provision for joinder of claims, together with the liberal joinder of parties
section, already discussed, would give our state procedure under the Proposed Code a flexibility heretofore unknown. We should by all means
adopt both of these measures.
The Proposed Code as originally drafted listed defenses which had to
be affirmatively plead. The provision followed Federal Rule 8 (c) identically by requiring "accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, and waiver" to be set forth affirmatively. The committee
amended this section so as to cut out all reference to these specific defenses.' 00 This action would seem undesirable for the retention of this
section would have given our code greater clarity and definiteness.

96. Mo.
97. Mo.

PROP. CODE, Art. 6, §§ 6 and
REv. STAT. (1939) § 917.

7:

98. N. Y. C. P. A. § 258 as amended by New York Laws 1935, c. 339; ILL.
(1937) c. 110, § 168; see English Rules Under the Judicature Act
(Annual Practice, 1937) 0. 18, r.r. 1-6. A short history of the development of
joinder of causes is found in Miller, op. cit. (1937) 30 HARv. L. REV. 1017, 10211025.
99. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 21; Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 2, §§ 10, 11(a).
100. Compare: Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8(c) and Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 6, § 9. See
also Ill. Pract. Act 1937, c. 110, § 168(4) which requires certain defenses to be
affirmatively plead.
REV. STAT.
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If the Proposed Code is adopted, time for pleading under state and
federal practice will substantially conform. Under the existing system it is
determined by terms of court.010 The time between pleadings may vary
from fifteen days to several months depending on the date for the opening
of the proper, term. Missouri should abolish this antiquated system, and
substitute in its place a simplified and more definite one. Briefly, under the
Proposed Code a responsive pleading must be served within twenty days
(subject to the court's power to enlarge time) after the prior pleading.102
If a motion is interposed it will extend the time for making a responsive
pleading. If the motion is denied or hearing on the motion is postponed
until trial, the responsive pleading may be filed within ten days after the
court's ruling. However, if the motion be one for a bill of particulars or
more definite statement and is granted, ten days are given to the one whose
pleading is attacked to meet the objection. After he serves his more definite
statement or the bill of particulars, the party who made the motion is given
ten further days in which to make his responsive pleading. Thus it is
evident that under the Proposed Code the pleading time would be definite
and not fortuitous; each party would be given a proportionate share of the
time eliminating the lopsided schedules which now obtain.
The Proposed Code has utilized the general phraseology of Federal
Rule 12 which sets up the procedure by which objections to pleadings may
be taken. 103 However certain modifications have been made which will
greatly change the procedure under the Proposed Code. We must briefly
compare the two systems before attempting an appraisal of the practice
as it would prevail under the latter.
Under the Federal Rules all defenses in law or fact must be plead in
the answer. However there are six enumerated defenses which may be made
by motion or answer at the pleader's option. These six are: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person,
(3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service
of process, and (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. 1 4 Hereafter, we may refer to the first five simply as the "jurisdictional defenses."
101.
102.
103.
104.

Demurrers, pleas, and exceptions for insufficiency of a

Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 921.
Mo. PROP. CODE,Art. 6, § 27.
Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 6, §§ 28-41.
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b).
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abolished. 05

pleading are
Attack on the form of the pleadings may be made
by a motion for a more definite statement, or for a bill of particulars, and
by a motion to strike.106
Whenever a pleader makes a motion he must consolidate therewith all
other motions then available to him. 07 Should he fail to do so, all opportunity to make any further objections by motion or defenses by motion is
lost. However, there is an exception to this rule. If a pleader makes a
motion joining solely jurisdictional defenses, he is not required at that time
to make the other motions then available. The latter may be made at a
later time within the pleading period. Thus the Federal Rules definitely
contemplate the possibility of a dual motion stage. A pleader is entitled to
have all motions heard and determined before trial unless the court in its
08
discretion orders the matter postponed till trial.
Coming now to the provisions in the Proposed Code, we find that all
defenses in law or fact are to be asserted in the answer. °0 However, there
are certain enumerated defenses which must be raised by motion and by
motion only." 0 The pleader is not given the option of pleading them in his
answer as under the Federal Rules. These defenses are: (1) the same five
jurisdictional defenses set forth above, and (2) that the plaintiff should
furnish security for costs. Notice that the "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted" has been omitted from this group.
As we have seen, objections, other than to jurisdictional matters and
to the legal sufficiency of the claim, must be raised in the answer under the
Federal Rules and cannot in any way be made in advance of pleading. In
this respect the contemplated practice in Missouri will differ, for it will be
possible to raise in advance the several dilatory defenses which are now subject to the typical code demurrer. The Proposed Code provides that the
following objections when they appear on the face of the pleading may be
made by motion:

(1) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted; (2) failure to state a legal defense to a claim; (3) that the plaintiff
has not the legal capacity to sue; (4) that there is another action pending
between the same parties, for the same cause, in this state; (5) that several
105. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 7(c).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 12(e), (f).
Id. at 12 (g).
Id. at 12(d).
Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 6, § 41.
Id. at § 30.
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claims have been improperly united; and (6) that the counterclaim or
cross-claim is one which cannot be properly interposed in the action.""
Demurrers and pleas in abatement and to the jurisdiction are abolished. 11 2
As in the case of the Federal Rules the pleader may move for a more definite
statement or for a bill of particulars; a motion to strike is available for
redundant, immaterial, impertinent and scandalous matter."1 3
All motions regardless of what objections or defenses they may raise
must be consolidated and made at one time.1 4 Jurisdictional defenses cannot be raised in advance. The Proposed Code, therefore, unlike the Federal
Rules, contemplates a single motion stage. Any defense or objection which
might be taken by motion must be so raised at the motion stage or be
deemed waived. The failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted and lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter are two substantive
defenses which are, of course, never waived. As in the case of the Federal
Rules, they may be raised at any time during the proceedings.
The foregoing is hardly more than a brief outline of the workings of
the two pleading systems, but will be enough for our purposes. The question
which now presents itself is whether it was wise to have departed so far
from the Federal Rules in drafting this part of the Proposed Code.
The writer believes that the consolidation of motions provision of the
Proposed Code is superior to its counterpart in the Federal Rules. Perhaps
in federal practice where nearly every case raises a question of jurisdiction,
it is better to provide means for raising this question in advance of every
other motion or pleading. Cases may frequently be decided on the jurisdictional issue alone. The value in time saved in these cases and the added
convenience, perhaps, far outweighs the disadvantage attendant upon setting
111. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 6, § 31. Notice similarity to the present Missouri
demurrer: "The defendant may demur to the petition when it shall appear upon
the face thereof, either:
(1) That the court has no jurisdiction of the defendant, or the subject of
the action; or (2) that the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue; or
(3) that there is another action pending between the parties, for the
same cause, in this state; or (4) that there is a defect of parties plaintiff
or defendant; or (5) that several causes of action have been improperly
united; or (6) that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; or (7) that a party plaintiff or defendant is not
a necessary party to a complete determination of the action." Mo.
REv. STAT. (1939) § 922.
,112. Mo. PRoP. CODE, Art. 6, § 28.
113. Id. at §§ 32, 33.
114. Id. at § 35.
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up another and separate stage in the pleading proceedings. However, these
reasons do not prevail in state practice, for certainly but few cases are decided solely on the issue of jurisdiction. Therefore it would seem more
desirable to require the pleader to join at one time his jurisdictional defenses with all other objections or defenses which are available by motion.
The necessity for consolidating all available motions on penalty of
waiver will be of great benefit to Missouri litigants. The opportunities now
presented to a pleader for vexation and delay by making successive demurrers and motions will be practically eliminated." 5r Too frequently these
devices have been used deliberately to prolong the proceedings only for the
purpose of harassing the plaintiff. The Proposed Code, by making "consolidation" a pleading requirement, will institute a timely improvement.
The Federal Rules- have to some extent perpetuated the old general
demurrer. By motion to dismiss, a pleader is able to object to the legal
sufficiency of the complaint and secure a determination of this matter in
advance of trial."' The only limitation rests in the court's discretion to
order the determination made at the trial. True enough, the motion is quite
different from the demurrer and by its flexibility avoids many of the objections of the latter. But, nevertheless, the significant feature of the demurrer
remains, namely, that it is still possible for a pleader, practically as a matter
of right, to secure a preliminary determination of the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. The desirability of this practice has been the subject of much
debate. 1 7 Several writers have maintained that the demurrer is no longer
used for the traditional purpose of disposing of the case on the legal issues.118
In fact, relatively few cases are settled on demurrer, since the tendency in
recent years has been to save any important legal issues for the trial. Hence,
the demurrer has largely become an instrument for testing the mere sufficiency of a pleading itself. Instead of settling the case on the merits, it
simply forces the pleader to amend, or plead over. There is, therefore,
ample reason for completely abolishing the demurrer.
115. Pike, Objections to Pleadings Uvder tle New Federal Rules of Civih
Procedure (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 50, 51, 58.
116. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b).
117.

CLARK, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND

(1938) 239. Clark and Moore, op. cit. (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1291, 1308; Miller, op.

cit. (1937) 50 HARV. L. REV. 1017, 1036-39; Pike, op. cit. (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 50,
56; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 343.
118. Atkinson, Pleading the Statute of Limitations (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 914,

928;

CLARK, CODE PLEADING

(1928) 371.
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The Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules attempted to do this very
thing. As the Rules were drawn, only the jurisdictional defenses could be
raised by a motion to dismiss in advance of pleading.1 9 All other objections
in law or fact had to be raised in the answer. However, if any defense presented in the answer was such that a decision thereon might finally dispose
of the whole or a material part of the issues, then the courts could order a
preliminary hearing and determination of the matter.120 If the court did
not order a preliminary hearing, then the defense would have to be heard
at the trial. The effect would have been to have wiped out all vestiges
of the general demurrer for the emphasis was placed upon the court's control of and discretion in ordering a preliminary hearing. No longer would
the parties have been entitled to a preliminary determination of a defense
as a matter of right. These provisions were largely adopted from the English
practice on this point2l which is believed by many to be the most desirable.1 22 However, as Dean Clark has pointed out,3 23 the elimination of the
preliminary proceeding was objectionable to many, and, hence, in the final
draft a compromise was struck by giving the pleader the privilege of testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint in advance, subject only to court's
power to postpone the matter until trial
The Proposed Code has not only followed the final draft of the Federal
Rules in this respect, but has taken a further retrogressive step which has
many positive objections. As mentioned above, the pleader under the Proposed Code will be able to raise by motion to dismiss not only objections in
Jaw appearing on the face of the pleading but all the traditional dilatory
defenses as well. This sounds like our existing code demurrer, dressed up in
the thin disguise of a motion.12 4 Section 36 has provided that a motion opens
the record, permitting a consideration of all substantial defects in prior
pleadings and requiring judgment to be rendered against the party who
119. Preliminary Draft of Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. (1937) 16(b).
120. Id. at 16(c).
121. See English Rules Under the Judicature Act (Annual Practice, 1937),
0. 25, r.r. 1-4. An objection in law is filed along with the answer on the facts, but
the court will consider it in advance of trial only where a decision would substantially dispose of the case. See, Miller, The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. REv. 197, 198, 204. As to the influence of Federal Equity
Rule 29, see Pike, op. cit. (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 50, 56-60.
122. See articles cited in note 117, supra.
123. CLARK, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND
(1938) 240; also HAMMOND, SOME CHANGES IN THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF FEDERAL RULES (1937) 629, 630.
124. See note 111, supra.
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first failed to state a claim or defense."' A clearer invitation to our courts
to treat the new motion as a mere substitute for a demurrer would be hard
to imagine. The old problem of distinguishing between defects which appear or do not appear on the face of the pleading will still be with us. At
the present time the courts draw fine distinctions as to the propriety of a
demurrer in a given situation and that of a motion to make more definite,
or to strike.126 May we not expect this same body of judicial technicality to
have continued vitality and that the motion to dismiss will be merely
slipped in where the demurrer previously stood? Judging by the experience
in other states this seems to be the customary result when the demurrer has
been abolished in name only.'27 The Federal Rules have wisely avoided to
a large extent this needless difficulty by requiring that all dilatory defenses
be made in the answer and by rejecting the "appearance on the face of the
pleading" test. In this respect it would have been more advisable for the
Proposed Code to have followed the Federal Rules.
In the last analysis the only justification for preserving the old code
demurrer must be measured by the extent to which it may be expected to
facilitate procedure under the new. Experience has demonstrated that the
demurrer has ceased to function otherwise than as an instrument for perfecting the sufficiency of the pleading itself, and as such has been too frequently employed only for purposes of delay.1 2 8 If this is any criteria of
what to expect of the substitute motion, certainly it should have no place
in a reform code. The utility of the demurrer even further declines when
liberal provisions for amendment of pleadings are provided as in the case of
the Federal Rules 129 or Proposed Code. 130 Objections to the sufficiency of
the pleadings can then be made with more convenience in the answer, there-

125. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. (1937) c. 110, § 169; Ill. Civ. Pract. Act 1933,
§ 45(4). See comment on Illinois practice of carrying back an attack on a prior
pleading by motion which is in effect the old rule that the demurrer searches the
record, in Miller, Pleading Under the Illinois Civil Practice Act (1933) 28 ILL. L.
REV. 460, 471.
126. The problem of distinguishing between matters of form and substance is
set out in POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (1929) §§ 487-495. See also, CLARK, CODE
PLEADING (1928) 374-381.
127. This seems to have been the New York experience where the courts have
developed "a hierarchy of different motions each of which must follow in its own
groove," thereby considerably complicating the practice. CLARK, CODE PLEADING
(1928) 372, n. 131.
128. See note 118, supra.
129. Fed Rules Civ. Proc. 15.
130. Mo. PROP. CODE, Art. 6, §§ 51-54.
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by rendering unnecessary a preliminary device for this purpose. The constant trend in procedural development has been towards a reduction of the
numerous pleading stages which was characteristic at common law.' 31 The
English practice clearly points the way; it now requires all defenses and
objections regardless of their nature to be raised in the answer. Since there
is no positive advantage to be had in retaining -the demurrer stage it should
be abolished entirely in the interest of speeding up the pleading process.
The Proposed Code in preserving the outdated code demurrer has taken
a retrogressive step, endangering the reform which we so sadly need in this
field.
CONCLUSION

With the repeal of the old Conformity Act and the adoption of the
Federal Rules an entirely new procedure was set up in the federal courts
in the place of the state procedure which used to be controlling. The result
has been that practitioners have been required to familiarize themselves
with two distinct procedures. The decision of Erie R. v. Tompkins' 32 has
made the situation even more illogical for the doctrine of that case requires
the federal courts to recognize as binding the substantive law of the state
in which the court is sitting. We now have therefore two court systems of
equal dignity within the same state administering the same substantive law,
yet each functioning under a wholly different form of procedure. Convenience and sound legal administration would seemingly require all states to
revise their codes so as to conform to the Federal Rules. 33 Unfortunately
Missouri's Proposed Code has not adhered as closely to the Rules as it
should have.134 Much criticism can be leveled against it on this ground, but
certainly should not be permitted to stand in the way of its adoption, inasmuch as a fair conformity between Missouri and federal practice would
be achieved.
Considering the Proposed Code only from the standpoint of the effect

131. Miller, op. cit. (1937) 50 HAuv. L. REv. 1017, 1038. For a fuller discussion
of the history and theory of this development, see Miller, The Formative Principles
of Civil Procedure-I (1923) 18 ILL. L. REv. 1, 24 et seq.
132. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
133. Mitchell, Uniform State and Federal Practice (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 981;
Recent Developments in Revision of State Civil Procedure (1940) 11 Mo. BAR J. 60.
134. E.g., see discussion of Arizona's recent adoption of Federal Rules, Sunderland, Arizona's New Rules of Procedure Effect Conformity with the Federal Rules
(1940) 23 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 215.
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it could be expected to have on Missouri procedure, it would seem that its
passage is mandatory. The draft has embodied the basic procedural devices
necessary for the modernization of our practice. A more general form of
pleading, free joinder of parties and claims, third party practice, pre-trial
conference, and an expanded discovery would greatly facilitate and improve our present procedure. These alone commend its passage.
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